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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of the first study 
comparing subjects’ responses to robotic emotional 
facial displays and human emotional facial displays.     
It describes step by step the building of believable 
emotional expressions in a robotic head, the problems 
raised by a comparative approach of robotic and human 
expressions, and the solutions found in order to ensure 
a valid comparison. Twenty adults and 15 children 
aged 3 were presented static (photos) and dynamic (2-D 
videoclips, or 3-D live) displays of emotional 
expressions presented by a robot or a person.  
The study compares two dependent variables: 
emotional resonance (automatic facial feed-back during 
an emotional display) and emotion recognition 
(emotion labeling) according to partners (robot or 
person) and to the nature of the display (static or 
dynamic). Results for emotional resonance were similar 
with young children and with adults. Both groups 
resonated significantly more to dynamic displays than 
to static displays, be they robotic expressions or human 
expressions. In both groups, emotion recognition was 
easier for human expressions than for robotic ones.  
Unlike children that recognized more easily emotional 
expressions dynamically displayed, adults scored 
higher with static displays thus reflecting a cognitive 
strategy independent from emotional resonance. 
Results are discussed in the perspective of the 
therapeutic use of this comparative approach with 
children with autism that are described as impaired in 
emotion sharing and communication.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing interest for emotion in 
neurocognitive sciences and in cognitive sciences such 
as robotics, developmental psychology and 
developmental psychopathology.  
Neuroimaging activations of Mirror Neurons in 
Broadman area when emotional stimuli are presented 
(Dapretto et al., 2006) supports the idea that the 
perception of an emotion resonate in the perceiver as if 
s/he felt the emotion expressed: that is why Trevarthen 
et al. (2005) call Mirror Neurons the sympathy neurons.  
Emotional resonance that couple the perception of one 
person to the action of another may be the underlying 
mechanism for emotional sharing (also called 
intersubjectivity). This phenomenon may well be 
expressed by the general tendency to mimic facial 
stimuli (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). 
Empathy is seen also as a case of emotional sharing 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Wicker et al., 2003), but here 
a frontier is designed between the owner of the emotion 
and the participant who knows that s/he is not 
experiencing directly the events at the origin of the 
emotion: the Who system activates agency and 
introduces a distance between experiencing and feeling 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004).  
Moreover, understanding the meaning of emotional 
displays as such does not necessarily leads to emotional 
sharing. In the field of developmental sciences, the 
recent stress on the ‘intentional stance’ has led to shed 
light on the cognitive role of emotions in the 
understanding of intentions (Hobson, 2004).   
This suggests that emotional resonance and emotion 
understanding and recognition are two separate though 
related components of the emotional system. How far 
they are related is not fully documented at the moment. 
It is however a main question for further knowledge in 
the field but also for the design of therapeutic tools in 
developmental psychopathology. Indeed, if we know 
more about the links between the cognitive aspects of 
emotion (reading emotion) and the phenomenological 
experience in play when we share, we will be able to 
propose to children with autism displays that altogether 
generate feelings and enhance reading emotion instead 
of our present designs that only deal with one of the 
two aspects. Within this framework, it is of high 
interest to know whether emotional resonance 
facilitates emotional recognition and understanding, 
whether emotional recognition enhances emotional 
resonance and whether these phenomenon can be 
observed also when facing an expressive robot 
compared to an expressive person. If we can resonate in 
front of a robot that displays believable facial 
expressions of emotion, then we can reasonably expect 
using expressive robots as therapeutic tools for 
emotional remediation in children with autism.   
 
 
In the field of robotics, the design of architectures 
aimed at reproducing and understanding the internal 
dynamics of emotional processes is an important part of 
the spurt of ‘affective devices’ (Wherle, 2001). Besides 
this option, affective computing has invested a large 
variety of foci with the ultimate goal to give a computer 
the ability to detect and use the different functions of 
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emotional signals: communication (Breazeal, 2002), 
problem solving and performance improvement 
(Canamero, 2001), information processing (Botelho & 
Coello, 2001; Frijda, 1995), interpersonal relationships 
(Aubé, 2001), and even empathy (Kozima, Nakagawa 
& Yano, 2003).   
 
Our common interdisciplinary interest for the 
intersubjective aspect of emotion has led to design a 
robotic expressive head with the purpose to explore 
how far it generates human emotional responses that 
can be compared to human-human intersubjective 
exchanges via emotion. As a second aspect of the 
question, recognition of facial expressions will be 
compared when the robotic or human stimuli presented 
are static displays or dynamic ones. This is of particular 
value given that dissociable neural pathways has been 
shown to be involved in the recognition of emotion in 
static and dynamic facial expressions (Kilts, Egan, 
Gideon, Ely, & Hoffman, 2003). It will be interesting 
to see whether the non-canonical aspect of the robotic 
expressions render more difficult the mental strategies 
required to recognize static displays in robots than in 
human. 
 
 
Before addressing this question in the realm of early 
normal and impaired development, an important pre-
requisite was to fix the external features of the 
emotional expressions of the robotic head. As put 
forward by Canamero and Gaussier (2005), “building a 
‘believable’ expressive robot …poses many challenges 
that need to be approached from a multidisciplinary 
perspective” (p. 251). This was exactly our process.  
 
The first step in our approach was to design the 
emotional patterns of the robot according to the 
scientific standards of the universal prototypical facial 
expressions described by Ekman and Friesen in their 
Facial Action Coding System (1976).  Two   FACS 
certified members of our group devoted much effort to 
achieve this step in order to ensure a valid comparison 
between the responses of the same adults when facing 
the expressive robot and when facing an expressive 
human actor.  
 
In a second step, the human actor was trained to mime 
consistently and reliably (according to the same 
scientific standards), the same prototypical expressions. 
His performance was validated by 20 adults who 
recognized his expressions as successfully as the 
prototypical expressions from Ekman and Friesen 
(1976).   
 
The third step was devoted to evaluate whether the 
robotic expressions were recognizable by a group of 20 
adults and to modify the static and dynamic displays 
accordingly. 
 
We will first present the set up, detail the steps aimed at 
preparing the experiment and then report the results 
concerning emotional resonance and emotion 
recognition according to the partner (robot or actor) and 
the display (dynamic or static) with a population of 
adults an a population of young children. The 
experiment with high functioning children with autism 
is in process.  
 
 
2. Setting and basic software 
 
The set-up was created by Gaussier and Canamero, and 
designed by Canet. It is composed of a robotic head 
linked to a laptop. Nested in the eye of the robot, a 
micro-camera films the subject’s behavior during the 
session. The eyes, eyebrows, eyelids and mouth are 
moved by 12 servomechanisms connected to a 12 
Channel Serial Servo Controller with independent 
variable speed. A home software is used to generate the 
5 prototypical facial expressions (+ neutral face) and to 
command the different servo motors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1- Neutral expression of the robotic head 
 
 
The communication speed between the robot head and 
the PC is 9600 Bd allowing to control each actuator 
every 40ms (25 times / sec) which is sufficient in the 
case of the present experiment. For each expression, a 
handwritten file describes the profile of speed and 
intermediate positions each actuator must follow in 
order to mimic correctly the corresponding facial 
expression (according to the judgement of human 
experts). As a whole, the set-up gives a reasonably 
believable version of a face though it is not totally 
realistic as there are no chin, no cheeks and no nose. 
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We consider however that there are good reasons to 
privilege simplicity over nearly perfect realism 
(Canamero & Gaussier, 2005). Movement seem to have 
more weight than appearance and a caricaturized face 
with rudimentary movement can be more effective than 
a sophisticated head from which people would expect 
highly realistic movements (Reichard, 1978). Here the 
movements are coherent, well synchronized and we 
have adjusted the timing according to the converging 
judgement of 15 adults during pre-experiments.  
 
 
3. Experiments 
 
Stimuli 
 
A. Robotic emotional expressions  
We have followed a discrete categories approach to 
produce five primary expressions: joy, sadness, 
surprise, fear and anger, completed by a neutral 
expression. The emotional expressions were created 
following the Facial Action Coding System standards 
elaborated by (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Once created, 
each emotional expression was analysed according to 
the action units that it involves and compared to the 
prototypic emotional expressions of human faces 
described by (Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002) as 
shown in figure 2 for surprise. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Surprise activates muscular action units that 
can be patterned by the robotic head 
 
 
Given that the set up has no nose, no chin and no 
cheeks, it is worth noticing that some action units 
cannot be created in the robot head (i.e. AU6, 
orbicularis oculi action, present in Duchenne Smile, see 
(Soussignan, (2002). 
 
The comparison between human and robotic 
expressions was lead by Simon and Soussignan (FACS 
certified) and asserted by Oster (as part of collaborative 
exchanges with Nadel’s group). 
Three series of robotic stimuli of emotion were derived 
from the expressions selected: static stimuli (photos), 2-
D dynamic stimuli (3-sec. films); 3-D dynamic stimuli 
(robot facing the subject on line). 
 
 
B. Human emotional expressions  
 
An experimenter was trained by the two FACS certified 
judges to display a neutral expression as well as the 
five primary emotional expressions (joy, sadness, 
surprise, fear and anger), until he met criterions of 
FACS emotional expressions. The expressions were 
analyzed in terms of the action units standardized by 
Ekman and Friesen (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and 
compared to the prototypical expressions of Ekman, 
Hager and Friesen’s repertoire (2002).  
Two presentations of the human stimuli were prepared: 
a static presentation (photos matched in quality of light, 
size and contrast with the photos of the robotic 
expressions) and a 2-D dynamic presentation (films 
matched on duration with the films of robotic 
expression).  We did not use a 3-D presentation for the 
person, because of the embarrassment or fun triggered 
by the sight of somebody miming disembedded 
emotions, but we will use it later with children and 
persons with autism.  
 
The recognition of the experimenter’s static 
expressions were compared to the recognition of 
pictures of facial affect developed by Ekman and 
Friesen (1976) in 20 young adults. A ANOVA with 
repeated measures showed no differences between the 
recognition of Ekman’s emotional expressions 
(m=4.85, SD=.366), and of our emotional expressions 
(m=4.85, SD=.489) [F(19,1)=0,000…, p=1]. Our 
population was shown to recognize the facial 
expressions similarly to Ekman and Friesen’s 
population  
 
 
 
Ekman’s population  Our population
Anger 100 100
Happy 100 100
Fear 92 95
Sadness 96 95
Surprise 96 95
 
 
Table 1- Percent recognition of Ekman’ s facial 
expressions in Ekman & Friesen population and in our 
own population 
These convergent elements allow us to consider that the 
facial expressions of our actor were similar to the 
prototypical ones provided by Ekman and Friesen’s 
(1976) classical set of facial expressions. 
 
 
AU 1+2 
AU 5 
AU 25+27 
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Hypotheses 
 
We hypothesized a positive effect of dynamic display 
on both resonance and recognition of emotional 
expressions. Our second hypothesis was that our 
subjects will respond more readily to human 
expressions than to robotic expressions, as a function of 
intersubjective resonance. This should be more obvious 
for young children that are not at ceiling concerning 
emotion recognition and labeling. 
 
 
Procedure 
 
The subjects (adults or children) were presented the 3 
series of robotic emotional stimuli first, and the two 
series of human emotional stimuli in a counterbalanced 
order. The series were proposed in the following order: 
dynamic 3-D, photos and dynamic 2-D for the robot 
head, photos and dynamic 2-D for the human face. 
There was a counterbalanced order for presentation of 
the different emotions in the different series.  As we 
were willing to record spontaneous feed-back to an 
emotional display, we mentioned only to the subjects 
that they will have to label the emotion displayed.  
 
The whole session lasted 3 minutes, each stimulus 
presented during 3 seconds. 
 
The subjects were filmed at their eye level by the 
micro-camera nested in the robot’s eye when the 3-D 
robotic display was concerned, or by a digital camera 
hidden in a box facing the subject for the presentation 
of all other displays. 
 
 
Dependent variables and coding 
 
Two dependent variables were used: subject’s facial 
expressions during the presentation of the emotional 
stimuli, and naming the emotion expressed after the 
presentation.  
 
In order to test the presence of a resonance effect, we 
analyzed the recordings of the subject’s facial 
movements during the 5 displays (3 displays for the 
robot, 2 displays for the person) of the 5 expressions 
(joy, surprise, fear, anger, sadness) in the 20 subjects, 
thus reaching an amount of 500 analyses of facial 
expressions. The analysis of the Action Units was 
performed using the Ekman, Hager and Friesen 
(2002)’s FACS standards by the two FACS experts. 
The two experts coded independently 40% of the 
subjects’ facial expressions with a mean Kappa 
agreement of .89. They were blind to the display 
observed by the subjects.  
 
In order to evaluate emotion recognition according to 
the display and the partner (robot or person), we asked 
the subjects to name the emotion after each emotional 
display has been presented.  
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
 
A. EXPERIMENT WITH ADULTS 
 
Population 
 
The population was composed of 20 healthy young 
adults.  
 
Results 
 
A series of ANOVAs with repeated measures was 
conducted.  
 
a. Resonance 
Concerning the resonance scores, an overall analysis 
showed no effect of partner (M-robot=1.95; M- 
person=2.35), but a significant effect of the display ([F 
(1, 19) = 22,7, p = .0013]: Whatever the partner, robot 
or person, the subjects resonated more for dynamic 
displays than for static displays. 
 
 
Resonance scores in adults according to the 
display and the partner
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Figure 3- Adults resonate more  to dynamic displays , 
whatever the partner  
 
significant statistical difference at p<.05 
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Figure 4- Spontaneous resonance to the expressive 
robot 
 
 
 
However, when analyzing the resonance scores for 
each emotion, a difference appeared concerning fear.  
Post-hoc Cochran test showed that the dynamic 
expression of fear induces more facial movements of 
fear when displayed by the person than by the robot 
(q=11.3,p=.01). In this case, facing a biological 
movement may lead to more direct investment in the 
emotional expression due to the evolutionary selection 
of fear as a significant signal of danger and its short 
circuit (LeDoux, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-  Resonating to a 2-D human display of fear  
 
 
 
b. Recognition  
Concerning recognition scores, an overall analysis 
showed a significant effect of partner: human 
expressions lead to higher scores of recognition than 
robotic expressions [F(1,19) = 12,7; p=.0021. A 
significant interaction between partner and display was 
found, showing that static displays of human 
expressions are more recognizable than the dynamic 
displays (although the static displays originate from the 
dynamic displays). To sum up, static displays of human 
expressions (photos) were recognized at best.  
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Figure 6- Static displays of human expressions are 
recognized best compared to dynamic human displays 
to robotic displays   
p<.05. 
 
 
Results found with adults allowed us to consider the 
robotic design believable and suitable for 
developmental research. 
 
 
B. EXPERIMENT WITH CHILDREN 
 
Population 
 
The population was composed of 15 children aged 2 
years 10 months to 3 years 4 months (mean age: 3 
years). The parents have given their informed consent 
and the children enrolled where those willing to 
participate. 
 
 
Results 
A series of ANOVAs with repeated measures was 
conducted.  
 
a. resonance 
 
An ANOVA comparing the overall synchronous 
(automatic) responses to facial expressions showed no 
effect of partner but a significant effect of display [F 
(2,28)= 5.76, p<.008], whatever the partner (see figure 
6).  
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b. recognition 
 
Computing together the responses for the 3 displays 
(photos, videoclips and live), we found that 3-year-olds 
recognize above chance the emotions of joy (42%) and 
sadness (38%) when expressed by the robot and the 
emotions of joy (64%), sadness (71%)  and anger 
(60%) when expressed by a person. Fear and surprise 
wee not recognized above chance. The ANOVA 
showed an overall effect of partner [F (1, 14) = 31,4 ; p 
= 0.000065]: the expressions of the person were 
recognized more frequently than the robotic 
expressions. This was true whatever the type of display 
as shown by significant post-hoc Tukey tests (p =.001 
for all displays). There was an overall effect of display 
[F (2, 28) = 4,8 ; p = 0,016]. Post-hoc Tukey test 
indicated that the dynamic 2D display (videoclip) 
generated significantly higher emotion recognition (p= 
0,013). Dynamic displays were especially helpful for 
recognition of robotic expressions.  
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The main results of our research can be summarized as 
follows: dynamic displays enhance emotional 
resonance to robotic expressions as well as to human 
expressions. By contrast, static displays facilitate 
emotional recognition, especially when human 
expressions are concerned.  These results however are 
not corroborated when the displays are presented to 
young children.  We will now discuss these findings in 
relation to robotic, psychological and 
neuropsychological state of the art.  
 
When roboticists are involved in the process of 
building an expressive robot, they are mainly 
concerned with the imperative that the facial emotional 
displays should be believable for humans. Otherwise, 
they are interested in establishing automated systems 
that can human facial muscle actions and learn to 
associate them to emotion (Panti2006).  Not only did 
we ensure that our robotic expressions were believable 
in a series of pre-experimental presentations, but we 
built up the emotional displays according to the 
universals of facial expressions described by Ekman 
and Friesen (1976) and Ekman, Friesen and Hager 
(2002). Thus the emotional facial displays are not only 
believable but they also represent universals of 
expressions. This is true as far as our 12 
servomechanisms can simulate complex and multiple 
facial muscle actions. More sophisticated robots with a 
silicon envelop may display a more fully successful 
simulation of muscle actions. But minimalist as it is our 
robotic head has lead to results that more accomplished 
designs will necessarily replicate if they were set-up 
according to the universal action units described by the 
FACS (Ekman, Friesen and Hager (2002): adults 
resonate to dynamic robotic expressions as readily as to 
dynamic human expressions.  These results are highly 
encouraging for further development of human-
machine interface. They are also critical for research in 
the realm of psychopathology of emotion. Indeed, if 
social aversion in autism inhibits emotional resonance, 
an expressive robot that does not generate such 
aversion might play an important role in emotion and 
interaction therapy (see Dautenhahn, 2003). 
Another finding with our population of adults is that 
emotion recognition is higher with photos than with 
dynamic displays. This tends to indicate independence 
between the process of recognition and the resonance to 
emotional patterns. The fact that dissociable neural 
pathways were found to be involved in the recognition 
of anger and happiness in static and dynamic facial 
expressions (Kilts et al., 2003) may explain this 
independence. As Kilts et al. concluded, the emotional 
content of static displays may be processed by mental 
strategies and neural activations that are distinct from 
more ecologically valid stimuli such as dynamic 
displays. The familiarity with photos and the stability 
of static stimuli may also be of help.  These results 
however were found with a population of adults that 
were nearly all at ceiling for emotion recognition.  
If we look now at what children teaches us about the 
development of the two aspects of emotion, resonance 
and recognition, and how they are related, we face 
another story. 
 
Our developmental approach focused on children’s 
responses to robotic vs. human expressions with a 
primary interest for the investigation of the role of 
emotional resonance as a basic condition for 
understanding others’ emotions (Nadel & Muir, 2005). 
This hypothesis relies on infancy research. A series of 
studies have shown that infants as young as 2 months 
react negatively to a delay introduced in the interactive 
loop between their own emotional behavior and their 
mother’s response (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Nadel 
et al., 1999; Nadel et al, 2005; Soussignan et al., 2006; 
Stormack & Braarud 2004), Their negative reaction is 
viewed as resulting from the early capacity to detect a 
violation of emotional resonance. As soon as mother 
responds contingently again, they re-establish positive 
signals of good emotional attunement. How can we 
interpret relatively poor emotional resonance in young 
children facing an expressive person or an expressive 
robot?  What happened with 50% of our population of 
3-year-olds suggest an explanation. Indeed we had to 
test 30 children aged 3 years to get 15 complete 
protocols. Fifty percent of the children refused to be 
presented the expressions of the human actor in vivo, 
while all of them accepted to be presented the robot in 
vivo. We understood that a context giving purpose and 
meaning to the facial emotions was required for the 
person while it was not for the robot. Around 3 years, 
children start relating facial emotional displays to 
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mental states. This suggest that while an emotional 
display in itself is evocative for adults, or for 5-year-old 
children, the adequate context is needed for younger 
children (i.e. if the person displays sadness, there 
should be something wrong in the environment). The 
capacity to evocate is not strong enough to resonate 
without a meaningful context.  
 
Recognition of emotion, as measured by labelling the 
facial display is limited to joy, sadness and anger. This 
is a classical finding with static displays of human 
expressions (Tremblay, Brun & Nadel, 2005). Unlike 
for adults, recognition is best in young children for 
static displays. What is striking is that young children 
resonate to facial expressions like fear that they cannot 
label. Reversely, they can label anger but do not 
resonate to, as if social display rules were controlling 
resonance (children should not show anger when their 
parents are angry toward them).  Like for adults, these 
results support the idea of a relative independence 
between resonance and recognition, One could argue 
that measuring recognition by labelling may not 
correctly correspond to young children’s capacity to 
distinguish different prototypic emotions. However, our 
results a re similar to previous results by Brun who 
used a non-verbal procedure where children had to 
match a facial expression with a vocal expression of 
emotion (see Tremblay et al., 2005 for details). As 
pointed by Kilts et al. (2003), maybe cognitive 
strategies in play in recognition of facial displays are 
not those activated in ecological and meaningful 
environments. The early sensitivity to resonance and its 
role in primary non verbal communication lead us to 
consider that it is the main basis for further 
understanding of emotions in others.  What for children 
with autism and emotion therapy? 
 
Behavioral studies (Hobson, 1986; Sigman et al., 
1992), and more recently neuro-imaging studies 
(Dapretto et al., 2006; Oberman et al., 2005) have 
investigated the possible impairment of emotion 
understanding as a key factor of an impaired 
understanding of the social world in autism. Instead of 
pointing on emotion recognition, we propose rather to 
focus on the capacity to resonate in contexts that are 
meaningful. We will get another picture concerning 
possible emotional impairment. For instance, low-
functioning children with autism initiate highly positive 
emotional exchanges with an unacquainted adult in a 
context of imitative interaction (Escalona et al., 2000; 
Field et al; 2001; Nadel et al, 2000). 
 
Finally, our paper gives a honest description of the 
problems and the solutions that can be found when we 
compare emotions expressed by a robotic head and a 
human face, and the interdisciplinary benefits of such a 
comparison for fundamental knowledge about emotion, 
for the development of therapy based on new 
technologies, and for advanced human-machine 
interactions.     
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